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SEISMIC SHIFTS – RECONFIGURING ‘CAPACITY’ IN LAW AND THE 
CHALLENGES OF ARTICLE 12 OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON 
THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES 
ROSALIND F CROUCHER AM* 
Internationally, the idea of ‘capacity’ has been shaken up and tossed around, and it 
is a process that is continuing. Medical and legal ideas have been unpicked and 
interrogated through the lens of human rights. The Hippocratic oath and law’s 
pragmatic transactional focus have locked horns in an intellectual battle in which the 
prize is a model of dignity and equality for those whose ability to make decisions is 
questioned.  
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) of 
2007 signalled a turning a point in terms of international commitment markers.1 Its 
definition of disability was a wide one, including ‘those who have long-term physical, 
mental, intellectual or sensory impairments which in interaction with various barriers 
may hinder their full and effective participation in society on an equal basis with 
others.’ It reflects a social approach to disability, requiring a policy focus on the 
person and their ability, with the support they require to interact with society and their 
environment; placing the policy emphasis not on ‘impairment’ but on ‘support’. Article 
12, ‘Equal recognition before the law’, represents the pole star in this area for legal 
policy makers and those engaged in intellectual discourse around the concepts of 
agency and capacity. Article 12, moreover, underpins the ability of persons with 
disability to achieve many of the other rights in the Convention. In countries with an 
ageing population like Australia and the United Kingdom,2 and the increase in the 
presentation of cognitive impairment and other disabilities that may accompany it,3 
Article 12 will be of increasing significance in the fields of elder law and policy. 
By ratifying the CRPD, state signatories accepted the obligations to recognise that 
persons with disability enjoy legal capacity on an equal basis with others in all 
aspects of life, and to take appropriate measures to provide persons with disability 
access to the support they may require in exercising their legal capacity. While 
implementation is clearly a multifaceted challenge, particularly in countries where a 
federal system splits responsibilities between the federal government and the 
governments of its states or provinces, a document like the CRPD both reflects and 
propels shifts in thinking.  
* President, Australian Law Reform Commission. Adjunct Professor, Macquarie University. In this
article I draw upon the ALRC report, Equality, Capacity and Disability in Commonwealth Laws, ALRC 
Report 124 (2014), of which I was the Commissioner in charge, and particularly chapter 2 of the 
report, which I wrote.  
1 UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature 30 March 2007, 999 
UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 May 2008).  
2  Australia: see, eg, Australian Bureau of Statistics, Reflecting a Nation: Stories from the 2011 
Census, 2012–2013: Who are Australia’s Older People? Cat No 2071.0 (2012). UK: see, eg, 
https://21stcenturychallenges.org/britains-greying-population/. Global data: World Economic Forum, 
Global Agenda Council on Ageing Society, Global Population Ageing: Peril or Promise? (2011), 5. 
3 The number of older persons with disability as a proportion of the total number of persons with 
disability is likely to increase with population ageing: see, eg, in relation to Australia, Australian 
Institute of Health and Welfare, Australia’s Welfare 2011 (2011), 11. 
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And the CRPD did reflect shifts in thinking; a paradigm shift from a model that was 
expressed in terms of ‘best interests’ to one that seeks to give expression to the ‘will 
and preferences’ of a person and which moves from an approach of substituted 
decision-making to supported decision-making. This model finds its practical voice in 
contexts such as ‘deputyship’ or ‘guardianship’, as it was historically known, and 
other situations involving assistance in or the making of decisions for others.  
 
In July 2013, the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) was given Terms of 
Reference to consider the recognition of people with disability before the law and 
their exercise of legal capacity on an equal basis. It resulted in the report, Equality, 
Capacity and Disability in Commonwealth Laws, ALRC Report 124 (2014). In leading 
this important inquiry I came to it as an academic lawyer and as a legal historian.4  
 
My background was in succession and property law and I was very familiar with 
law’s approach to capacity questions; ones that arise usually in retrospect when a 
transaction – such as a contract or a will – is challenged or sought to be undone on 
the basis of a lack of legal capacity. Law manages such matters in a functional way. 
Capacity is considered as fluctuating and calibrated to the transaction in hand. This 
is certainly how testamentary capacity is tested, in which the leading case involved 
someone who had been committed to a ‘lunatic asylum’.5 The decision about his 
capacity to make a will was a legal one, not a medical one. 6  Mr Banks was 
institutionalised because of his mental health issues. He was diagnosed as having 
paranoid schizophrenia because of delusions, believing that devils or evil spirits were 
chasing him and that Featherstone Alexander was pursuing him, notwithstanding 
that he was dead. Banks was considered to be ‘insane’. However, he managed his 
financial affairs, his testamentary plans were sensible ones, and his delusions were 
considered irrelevant to his scheme of testamentary disposition. His ‘mental disease’ 
was not considered as affecting his testamentary capacity. His will stood. 
 
Legal capacity sets the threshold for individuals to take certain actions that have 
legal consequences. For example, a range of transactions may involve an age 
threshold as a benchmark of when a person is regarded as being able to act 
independently and with binding effect – to have legal agency to make ‘legally 
effective choices’.7 Legal capacity goes to the validity – in law – of choices and being 
4 I was assisted wonderfully by Graeme Innes, then Disability Discrimination Commissioner, who was 
given an additional ‘hat’ as a part time Commissioner of the ALRC. 
5 Banks v Goodfellow (1870) LR 5 QB 549. 
6 The presumption of capacity arises if the will is rational on its face and is duly executed. See, eg, 
Gino Dal Pont and Ken Mackie, Law of Succession (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2013) ch 2. This was 
expressed in the legal maxim ‘omnia praesumuntur rite et somemniter esse acta’: all acts are 
presumed to have been done rightly and regularly.  
7 Terry Carney and David Tait, The Adult Guardianship Experiment—Tribunals and Popular Justice 
(Federation Press, 1997) 3. With respect to the idea of legal agency, see: Mary Donnelly, Healthcare 
Decision-Making and the Law—Autonomy, Capacity and the Limits of Liberalism (Cambridge 
University Press, 2010) 24; Bernadette McSherry, ‘Legal Capacity Under the Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities’ (2012) 22 Legal Issues 23 and (2012) 20 Journal of Legal 
Medicine 22. The right to recognition as a legal agent is also reflected in art 12(5) CRPD, which 
outlines the duty of States Parties to ‘take all appropriate and effective measures to ensure the equal 
right of persons with disabilities to own or inherit property, to control their own financial affairs and to 
have equal access to bank loans, mortgages and other forms of financial credit and shall ensure that 
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accountable for the choices made. ‘Those who make the choice’, Emeritus Professor 
Carney states, ‘should be able to provide valid consent, and make decisions for 
which they can be held accountable. They should, in short, be legally competent.’8 
 
As the law generally approaches these questions retrospectively, it starts with a 
presumption of capacity; a challenge on the basis of a lack of capacity (in the sense 
of agency) is brought to rebut the presumption of legal capacity, as in the example of 
John Banks’ will. The common law – including doctrines of equity – also includes 
protective doctrines for vulnerable people, such as the doctrines concerning undue 
influence and unconscionable transactions.9 Where a lack of the required level of 
understanding is proved in the particular circumstances, the transaction may be set 
aside. Such doctrines focus on a transaction and the circumstances surrounding it. 
They are decision-specific and involve assessments of understanding relevant to the 
transaction being challenged – a functional approach. As a lawyer, this appeared 
respectful and based on the premise of autonomy. The common law presumption of 
capacity has, after all, been described as ‘the law’s endorsement of autonomy’.10 
 
But in leading the ALRC inquiry on capacity, my eyes were opened. We had to start 
somewhere else.11 If you start from a presumption, you separate people; between 
those with capacity and those without. For in every presumption lies the possibility of 
rebuttal. It is a binary model, and for those with lived experience of disability it is 
deeply troubling. What the idea of equality means to people with disability is not a 
definition of capacity based on a presumption. The United Nations Committee on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD) emphasised that the idea of equality 
reflected in Article 12 is essentially about the exercise of human rights: ‘[e]quality 
before the law is a basic and general principle of human rights protection and is 
indispensable for the exercise of other human rights’.12  
 
Legal capacity is clearly a different concept from ‘mental capacity’ and should not be 
confused with it.13 The UNCRPD commented that the Convention ‘does not permit 
perceived or actual deficits in mental capacity to be used as justification for denying 
legal capacity’. 14  This reflects two concerns: first, that legal capacity should not 
simply be equated with mental capacity; secondly, that people with cognitive 
persons with disabilities are not arbitrarily deprived of their property’: United Nations Committee on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, General Comment No 1 on Article 12 of the Convention—
Equal Recognition before the Law, 2014 [11]. 
8 Ibid. 
9 See, eg, Dyson Heydon and Mark Leeming, Cases and Materials on Equity and Trusts (LexisNexis 
Butterworths, 8th ed, 2011) ch 14. 
10 Mary Donnelly, Healthcare Decision-Making and the Law—Autonomy, Capacity and the Limits of 
Liberalism (Cambridge University Press, 2010) 93. 
11 The starting point we concluded upon was expressed as the first of the ‘National Decision-Making 
Principles’: ‘All Adults have an equal right to make decisions that affect their lives and to have those 
decisions respected’. That is, we started with the right, not the rebuttable presumption. 
12 United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, General Comment No 1 on 
Article 12 of the Convention—Equal Recognition before the Law, 2014 [1].  
13 See, eg, the distinction between medical and legal perspectives in Terry Carney, ‘Guardianship, 
“Social” Citizenship and Theorising Substitute Decision-Making Law’ in Israel Doron and Ann M 
Soden (eds), Beyond Elder Law (Springer, 2012) 1.  
14 United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, General Comment No 1 on 
Article 12 of the Convention—Equal Recognition before the Law, 2014 [12]. 
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impairment should not be assumed to have limited legal capacity, in the sense of 
being able to exercise legal agency. What is clearly not appropriate in the context of 
the CRPD is a disqualification or limitation on the exercise of legal capacity because 
of a particular status, such as disability, or, like John Banks, because of a particular 
mental health condition. The approach should therefore be on the support needed to 
exercise legal agency, rather than an assumption or conclusion that legal agency is 
lacking because of an impairment of some kind, whether physical or mental.  
 
In adopting an approach that shifted away from ‘substitute decision-making’ to 
‘supported decision-making’, the ALRC report embraced the paradigm shift 
embodied in the CRPD. There is an important distinction between them but it is also 
the point about which most confusion has arisen. There is an evident tension in the 
way that the labels of ‘supported decision-making’ and ‘substitute decision-making’ 
are used; the discourse around Article 12, including the submissions made to the 
UNCRPD in response to its draft General Comment on Article 12 in 2013,15 has 
exacerbated this tension.16  
 
Any discussion about substitute decision-making needs to distinguish two separate 
issues: the first is the appointment of a person to act on behalf of another and the 
scope of the person’s powers; the second is the standard by which that appointee is 
to act. They are entirely separate points but are often confused. The appointee may 
be chosen by the person themselves, for example through instruments such as 
enduring powers of attorney, or by a court or tribunal, in the appointment of a 
guardian, deputy or financial administrator. The standard is the test by which any 
decision-making by the appointee is to occur. The danger in analytical terms is to 
condemn the appointment of a person to act on behalf of another simply by virtue of 
the appointment, presupposing that the appointee will not act in a way that places 
the individual at the centre of the decision-making process. 
 
Decision-making support has a long history, conventionally summarised in the 
evolution and development of guardianship regimes.17 Traditional guardianship laws 
have been described as exceedingly paternalistic, 18  protecting the estate of the 
person under protection, and not promoting their autonomy, especially where plenary 
forms were used involving a complete vesting of authority in another person. The 
15 United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Draft General Comment on 
Article 12 of the Convention—Equal Recognition before the Law, 2013. The submissions in response 
are at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CRPD/Pages/DGCArticles12And9.aspx. The final General 
Comments No 1 and No 2 were adopted by the UNCRPD on 11 April 2014. 
16  General Comments are provided by way of guidance and are different from legally binding 
obligations as reflected in the CRPD itself. The Rules of Procedure of the UNCRPD provide that it 
may prepare General Comments ‘with a view to promoting its further implementation and assisting 
States Parties in fulfilling their reporting obligations’: UNCRPD, Rules of Procedure (5 June 2014) 
r 47. 
17 For the history of guardianship, see, eg: William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 
(1765) vol 1, 292–294; Terry Carney, ‘Civil and Social Guardianship for Intellectually Handicapped 
People’ (1981) 8 Monash UL Rev. 199; John Seymour, ‘Parens Patriae and Wardship Powers: Their 
Nature and Origins’ [1994] Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 159; Sarah Burningham, ‘Developments in 
Canadian Adult Guardianship and Co-Decision-Making Law’ (2009) 18 Dalhousie J. Legal Stud. 119; 
Shih-Ning Then, ‘Evolution and Innovation in Guardianship Laws: Assisted Decision-Making’ (2013) 
35 Sydney Law Review 133. 
18 Eg, Victorian Law Reform Commission, Guardianship, Final Report No 24 (2012) [6.95]–[6.96]. 
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disability rights movement of the 1960s led to increasing pressure to move away 
from such models, championing a social rather than a medical model of disability.19  
 
Such efforts sought to limit the scope of appointment of substitute decision-makers, 
such as guardians, to achieve the ‘least restrictive option’. But they also focused on 
the standard by which the appointee was to act: ‘best interests’ standards were ones 
that preceded, and were to be contrasted with a ‘substituted judgment’ approach. 
The ‘best interests’ principle was seen to reflect the idea of ‘beneficence’; a dominant 
theme in medical ethics in which the ‘primary imperatives were for doing good for the 
patient, the avoidance of harm and the protection of life’.20 A ‘best interests’ standard 
‘requires a determination to be made by applying an objective test as to what would 
be in the person’s best interests’. A ‘substituted judgment’ standard, in contrast, is 
‘what the person would have wanted’,21 based, for example, on past preferences. 
Substitute decision-making can therefore apply in two broadly different ways: one 
involves an objective ‘best interests’ standard and the other involves a focus on what 
the person wants or would have wanted (‘substituted judgment’).22 
 
Even in a reformed context of being committed to advancing individuals’ rights, 
however, ‘best interests’ standards were still retained in language and in form. ‘Best 
interests’ and the person’s wishes are both used – a combination of subjective and 
objective.  
 
For example, the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (UK) s 4(6) requires a person making a 
determination of ‘best interests’ to consider, ‘so far as is reasonably ascertainable’: 
 
(a) the person’s past and present wishes and feelings (and, in particular, any relevant written 
statement made by him when he had capacity), 
(b) the beliefs and values that would be likely to influence his decision if he had capacity, and 
(c) the other factors that he would be likely to consider if he were able to do so.23 
 
In addition, s 4(7) requires the decision-maker to take into account, ‘if it is practicable 
and appropriate to consult them’, the views of: 
 
(a) anyone named by the person as someone to be consulted on the matter in question or on 
matters of that kind, 
(b) anyone engaged in caring for the person or interested in his welfare, 
(c) any donee of a lasting power of attorney granted by the person, and 
(d) any deputy appointed for the person by the court, 
(e) as to what would be in the person’s best interests and, in particular as to the matters 
mentioned in subsection (6). 
 
19 Ibid [2.8] 
20 Mary Donnelly, Healthcare Decision-Making and the Law—Autonomy, Capacity and the Limits of 
Liberalism (Cambridge University Press, 2010) 11. Donnelly refers to the Hippocratic Oath. 
21 Explanatory Notes, Mental Capacity Act 2005 (UK) [28]. 
22 The latter approach was the one advocated by the ALRC. The ‘best interests’ approach was also 
rejected by the Scottish Law Commission in its Report 151, Incapable Adults, 1995 [2.50]. See Adrian 
D Ward in ‘Abolition of Guardianship? “Best interests” versus “best interpretation”’ (2015) Scots Law 
Times. 
23 A similar model is included, for example, in the Mental Health Act 2014 (WA), pt 2 div 3, ‘Best 
interests of a person’. 
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Of such a hybrid standard, Dr Mary Donnelly writes that it ‘attempts to mitigate the 
consequences of a loss of capacity while staying within a best interests 
framework’.24 The overall question is an objective one, but it is informed by past and 
present wishes and the opinion of others as to what would be in the person’s best 
interests. In its application it appears that the UK section is being applied more 
towards the subjective than the objective, using the decision in Aintree University 
Hospital NHS Foundation Trust v James as the illustration and the comments of 
Lady Hale that the purpose of the best interests test in the 2005 Act is ‘to consider 
matters from the patient’s point of view’.25  
 
By the second decade of the 21st century, the approach being advocated was 
described as ‘supported decision-making’, placing the person who is being 
supported at the front of the decision-making process. The decision is theirs. 
Supported decision-making emphasises the ability of a person to make decisions, 
provided they are supported to the extent necessary to make and communicate their 
decisions. It focuses on what the person wants.  
 
As our exploration of the literature revealed, however, in the context of developing –
and championing – ‘supported decision-making’, ‘substitute’ has often been equated 
with ‘guardianship’, and both are assumed to represent a standard that is not 
consistent with the rights of persons with disability. The fact that someone is 
appointed as a substitute becomes problematic of itself, rather than focusing upon 
how the substitute is to act. Interwoven in the discussion about ‘substitute’ and 
‘supported’ decision-making is therefore a lack of conceptual clarity about the role 
that a person’s wishes and preferences play when another acts for them as a 
‘substitute’ decision-maker; and the role that a ‘supporter’ plays in assisting a person 
to make decisions.  
 
Conceptual confusion is also exacerbated when models use ‘best interests’ 
language, but are expressed in terms of giving priority to the person’s wishes and 
preferences, such as in the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (UK). Given the tensions 
around the usage and understanding about ‘substitute’ decision-making – and the 
blurring between ‘substituted judgment’ and ‘substitute decision-making’ – we 
concluded that it was preferable to move away from this language altogether. The 
terms we recommended were ‘supporter’ and ‘representative’ and they were 
articulated in a model focused on Commonwealth decision-making. Indeed, given 
how loaded and conflicted the language and discourse is in some respects, we 
advocated what I described as a ‘new lexicon’.26 
 
The next challenge for signatories to the CRPD is to translate the UNCRPD’s 
conclusions in relation to Article 12 into their review of their guardianship and 
24 Mary Donnelly, Healthcare Decision-Making and the Law—Autonomy, Capacity and the Limits of 
Liberalism (Cambridge University Press, 2010) 203. This approach, she writes, is ‘not without 
difficulties’. 
25 [2013] UKSC 67. A more recent legislative example is the Assisted Decision-Making (Capacity) Act 
2015 (Ireland), which does not use ‘best interests’ language at all. 
26 Australian Law Reform Commission, Equality, Capacity and Disability in Commonwealth Laws, 
ALRC Report 124 (2014) [1.8]. It is interesting to note that the language of ‘decision-making 
representatives’ has been adopted in the Assisted Decision-Making (Capacity) Act 2015 (Ireland). 
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deputyship laws. While the General Comment about Article 12 was prompted by 
what the UNCRPD described as ‘a general misunderstanding of the exact scope of 
the obligations of States Parties under Article 12’,27 the hardening of the position 
between the draft and final versions of the General Comment is quite confronting.28 
The UNCRPD suggested that substitute decision-making regimes should be 
abolished and replaced by supported decision-making regimes and the development 
of supported decision-making alternatives. Most importantly, the Committee 
commented that ‘[t]he development of supported decision-making systems in parallel 
with the retention of substitute decision-making regimes is not sufficient to comply 
with Article 12’.29 What is required is ‘both the abolition of substitute decision-making 
regimes and the development of supported decision-making alternatives’.30 This may 
not sit entirely comfortably where States Parties are committed to reforming their 
guardianship laws towards supported decision-making models, but still see the need 
for the appointment of a substitute decision-maker in certain cases as a matter of 
last resort.  
 
And how is Article 12(4) to be reconciled with this approach? It provides that: 
 
States Parties shall ensure that all measures that relate to the exercise of legal capacity 
provide for appropriate and effective safeguards to prevent abuse in accordance with 
international human rights law. Such safeguards shall ensure that measures relating to the 
exercise of legal capacity respect the rights, will and preferences of the person, are free of 
conflict of interest and undue influence, are proportional and tailored to the person’s 
circumstances, apply for the shortest time possible and are subject to regular review by a 
competent, independent and impartial authority or judicial body. The safeguards shall be 
proportional to the degree to which such measures affect the person’s rights and interests. 
 
The requirements of safeguards that ‘respect the rights, will and preferences’ of the 
person, and that they be ‘proportional’, ‘tailored to the person’s circumstances’, 
‘apply for the shortest time possible’ and are subject to ‘regular review’ seem 
implicitly to acknowledge measures that may be regarded as ‘substitute’ models. We 
concluded that, while substitute decision-making models that reflect the constraints 
identified in Article 12(4) may technically not be contrary to the CRPD, ‘[t]here is still 
considerable debate over the significance of the [CRPD] for guardianship’.31 The 
burning question is whether ‘guardianship’/‘deputyship’ is compatible with the 
CRPD? Or is it rather a question of what kind of guardianship (or whatever other 
label is used) is incompatible with it? Namely, is it only guardianship where decisions 
are made without reference to the wishes and preferences of the person under 
protection?  
 
27 United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, General Comment No 1 on 
Article 12 of the Convention—Equal Recognition before the Law, 2014 [3].  
28 This was also pointed out by Adrian D Ward ‘Abolition of Guardianship? “Best interests” versus 
“best interpretation”’ (2015) Scots Law Times 
29 Ibid [24]. Emphasis added.  
30 Ibid. Emphasis added. 
31 John Chesterman ‘The Future of Adult Guardianship in Federal Australia’ (2013) 66 Australian 
Social Work 26, 31. See Australian Law Reform Commission, Equality, Capacity and Disability in 
Commonwealth Laws, ALRC Report 124 (2014) [2.8]. 
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Australia expressed concern that the draft General Comment was characterising the 
entirety of Article 12 ‘in absolute terms’,32 although Article 12 itself is not expressed 
in this fashion:  
 
Australia considers that while it is important that the legal capacity of persons with disabilities is 
respected to the fullest extent possible, there are circumstances in which substituted decision-
making may be the only available option. Australia considers that guidance from the Committee 
on the most human rights compatible approach in situations where a person does not have, 
either temporarily or permanently, the capacity to make or communicate a decision, would be 
useful to States Parties.33 
 
Australia argued that, in a number of respects, the draft General Comment sought to 
extend the scope of Article 12 beyond that of existing expressions of both equality 
before the law and ‘legal capacity’ in international human rights law. It stated that the 
most significant example of this is ‘the characterisation of Article 12 as requiring 
supported decision-making and not permitting substituted decision-making in any 
circumstances’: 
 
The statement that there are no circumstances permissible in which a person may be deprived 
of the right to recognition as a person before the law, or to have this right limited, relates to 
article 16 of the ICCPR, rather than article 12 of the Convention. The ICCPR provides for this in 
article 4(2), which states that no derogation from that right is permissible even in times of public 
emergency. The Convention does not contain a similar provision. However, Australia accepts 
that this is applicable in relation to article 12(1).34 
 
Australia reiterated that it did not consider Article 12 required the abolition of all 
substitute decision-making regimes and mechanisms. 35  Other States Parties 
expressed similar concerns with the language of the draft General Comment.36 A 
joint submission from the Equality and Human Rights Commission, the Equality 
Commission for Northern Ireland, the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission 
and the Scottish Human Rights Commission observed, for example: 
 
This absolutist approach appears to base the minimum acceptable standard on the maximum 
desired conduct, rather than taking a more pragmatic approach which reflects the state of 
opinio juris, the complexity of the issues and the emerging nature of supportive decision making 
regimes.  
 
The draft does not, for example, appear to give consideration to the changes that have been 
made in a significant number of countries to develop a human rights-based approach to legal 
capacity that provide a range of measures, beginning with the presumption of capacity, and are 
tailored to individual capabilities and needs. 
 
While stating an absolutist position, the draft offers little in terms of guidance as to how it should 
be observed, including in difficult cases.37 
32  Australian Government, Submission to the UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities, Draft General Comment on Article 12 of the Convention–Equal Recognition before the 
Law, 2014, [13]. 
33 Ibid [16]. 
34 Ibid [21]. 
35 Ibid [24]. 
36 See submissions to the UNCRPD on the draft General Comment from, eg, Denmark, New Zealand 
and Norway: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CRPD/Pages/DGCArticles12And9.aspx. 
37 Joint Submission from the Equality and Human Rights Commission, the Equality Commission for 
Northern Ireland, the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission and the Scottish Human Rights 
Commission, UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Draft General Comment on 
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There are distinct threads in such submissions. First, that an approach of supporting 
decision-making is paramount; secondly, that any appointment of a person to act on 
behalf of another should be limited, a last resort and subject to safeguards 
compatible with human rights; and thirdly, that the CRPD does not prohibit the 
appointment of a person to act on behalf of another.  
 
What is not clearly disentangled, however, is separating the fact of an appointment in 
certain circumstances and how the person is to act. Both are subsumed in the 
argument that, in some limited circumstances, ‘substitute decision making’ may be 
appropriate, without closely interrogating what substitute decision-making means. 
The argument is therefore expressed in terms of ‘supported’ versus ‘substitute’ 
decision-making. 
 
The ALRC considers that the focus of analysis needs to be on how support is 
translated into a principles-based model that may guide law reform. How should 
support be articulated as the principal idea, consistent with the Convention and the 
concerns of the UNCRPD? What is the standard by which supporters and anyone 
appointed to act on behalf of another are to act? What is the standard to apply when 
the will and preferences of a person are not evident and cannot be determined? 
What is a human rights compatible approach?  
 
The most difficult policy challenges concern those who require the most support. 
Where a person’s will and preferences are difficult, or impossible to determine, they 
may need someone else to make decisions on their behalf. These hard cases should 
not, however, be treated as a barrier to building law and legal frameworks that move 
towards supported decision-making in practice, as well as in form.  
 
For the ALRC, the inquiry was a deeply reflective and respectful process and we 
embraced the task of proposing a new model in Commonwealth laws as the 
opportunity to make a singular contribution in this crucial field. We recognised, 
however, that changes in law, of themselves, do not effect change, but changes in 
law are important and can play a normative role. As remarked in one important joint 
submission: 
 
Changing laws and implementing new policies regarding legal capacity is only the first step in 
realising the right to equal recognition before the law for people with disability.38  
 
An important first step, indeed. And while supported decision-making is, after all, 
much more than just about law, 39 the intellectual engagement around Article 12 
Article 12, 28 February 2014: 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CRPD/Pages/DGCArticles12And9.aspx, 4. 
38 People with Disability Australia, Australian Centre for Disability Law, Australian Human Rights 
Centre, Submission 136. Others who supported this approach included: ACT Disability, Aged and 
Carer Advocacy Service, Submission 108. The submissions are published at 
http://www.alrc.gov.au/inquiries/disability/submissions.  
39 Bernadette McSherry ‘Support for the Exercise of Legal Capacity: The Role of the Law’ (2015) 22 
Journal of Legal Medicine 739; Terry Carney, ‘Participation and Service Access Rights for People with 
Cognitive Impairments: An Australian Perspective’ (2015) 4 Laws 37; Piers Gooding, ‘Supported 
Decision-Making: A Rights-Based Disability Concept and its Implications for Mental Health Law’ 
(2013) 20 Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 431. 
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helps propel thinking and practice and the commitment nationally and internationally 
towards the equal right of all adults to make decisions that affect their lives and to 
have those decisions respected.40 
 
40  The first of the National Decision-Making Principles in Australian Law Reform Commission, 
Equality, Capacity and Disability in Commonwealth Laws, ALRC Report 124 (2014). 
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